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THE PHILOSOPHY OF LENIENCY IN CRIME TREATMENT
Justin Millerl

Those who are charged with the custody and control of persons convicted
of crime occupy, in the field of crime
treatment, much the same position as
do the pathologists in the field of the
treatment of disease. After organized
society has failed-through its homes,
schools, churches, hospitals, industrial
organizations and other institutionssafely to integrate certain of its members into its conventional structure, or
to protect them against the savage impacts of a ruthlessly individualistic and
competitive way of life, it turns over
to custodial officers, not merely the
physical bodies, but the twisted mentalities or inadequate person'alities of
its victims; in other words, comparatively speaking, it turns over to them
the diseased tissues of the 'great body
of human society.
In doing so, organized society would
avoid guilt for its own ignorance, wilfullness and negligence by insisting,
first, that those who fail are, themselves, personally responsible for their
failures and second, that, given a period
of penitence and punishment, they will
become able and willing to compete
successfully. Perhaps there is a small
measure of truth in both contentions.
To the extent that it is possible to
effect rehabilitation in particular instances, society should be grateful.
'Associate Justice, U. S. Court of Appeals,
Washington, D. C., Vice-President, American
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology. This

But, generally speaking, the greatest
role which custodial staffs can play is
-like the role which the pathologists
are playing in the field of disease control-that of prevention. As Warden
James A. Johnston has well said: "I
believe our greatest difficulties and our
greatest opportunities are . . . in preventing crime in the first instance; in
the better use of social and economic
agencies."
Operation of Leniency
It is with this thesis in mind that
the subject: The Philosophy of Leniency in Crime Treatment has been
chosen. In using the word philosophy
I have in mind that definition of the
word which speaks in terms of a generally accepted body of knowledge in
any particular field of thought. In
using the word leniency I mean to distinguish between crime treatment
which, on the one hand, is based upon
sentiment, emotion, and perhaps personal relationships existing between the
offender and the person who deals with
him, and on the other hand, treatment
which is based upon considerations of
the protection of society, the rehabilitation of the offender, his preparation
for release and eventual re-integration
into the social group as a self-supportOf
ing, self-respecting individual.
paper was read before the Prison Congress in
San Francisco in September, 1941.
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course there is no clear line of distinction between the two, especially in
actual operation. Nevertheless, they do
serve to indicate well-recognized, even
though more or less coalescing procedures. For the purpose of this discussion leniency is a symbol of an attitude. which is widely prevalent;
which, I fear, is much more potent in
determining the nature of crime treatment than the theories and practices of
scientific penology; and which is even
more potent in determining the reactions of the various groups in society
which cause laws to be passed, taxes
to be levied, money to be appropriated
and standards to be set for the control
of crime. You are all aware that leniency plays a large part in the treatment of crime. As I review some of
its manifestations, you will agree, I
think, that it is proper to assume the
existence of a generally accepted body
of knowledge concerning the part
which it plays; hence a philosophy.
In its best known phase, leniency
functions in the form of the pardoning
power or of executive clemency. Historically speaking, this was a source
of revenue -to the king who sold his
grace or pardon to offenders who could
afford to pay. In the legal tradition of
our country it has been retained in
order to make possible an executive
check upon possible legislative and judicial excesses in the punishment of
offenders. Although in some instances
it functions according to this theory,
probably in most cases, to a greater
or less degree, it is in fact a matter
of executive grace. Extreme instances
of executive misconception of the

nature of the power are found in the
mass pardoning of prisoners which has
occurred in some states at Christmas
time, or when a governor is about to
leave office, or when a governor leaves
the state and a subordinate officer,
serving as acting governor, releases a
large group of prisoners.
But, quantitatively speaking, executive pardons constitute a very small
proportion of the total of acts of official
leniency. Leniency may manifest itself
in unwise laxity of prison discipline.
Warden Johnston has said on this
point:
"Firm discipline is essential in dealing
with prisoners. I mean insistence on absolute obedience to regulations and the
orders of those in authority. I would not
make a fetish of rules. I prefer reason.
But there are rules of reason and reasonable rules, and prisoners should be compelled to obey them; otherwise no
progress can be made toward their reformation because chiefest of their faults,
perhaps fundamental in crime causes, is
disobedience. Records are replete with
evidence of their disobedience at home,
school, shop, everywhere flouting authority and continuousl giving way to
their undisciplined desires."
Of course such discipline may be difficult
to secure in ill-equipped institutions;
where, for example, opportunity for
that "honest-to-goodness work" which
he so heartily recommends cannot be
provided.
To the extent that parole and other
similar release procedures are used for
the discharge of prisoners in situations
which do not conform to the standards
recently declared by the Attorney General's Parole Conference, to that extent
the motive for such discharges is largely one of leniency. This is particularly
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true.. where parole is granted without
determining, first, whether the prisoner
will probably succeed on parole and,
second, whether he can be released
with safety to the security of the community into which he goes. In many
instances leniency is the controlling
motive operating in release on probation. This is revealed frequently by the
statement that, "the first offender is
entitled to another chance." It is particularly true where probation is used,
on such a theory, without an adequate
pre-sentence investigation; because in
many cases the first offender in one
place may have offended repeatedly in
other places. Generally speaking, it is
true in all cases, because a first offender
in court has usually offended many
times in a long suffering family or complacent community life. His appearance in court usually results from repeated or flagrant violations of conventions which the family or community
will no longer stomach. His capacity
to say "I'm sorry;" to abase himself
in the presence of the judge; to affect
contrition for his misdeeds and to
promise tearfully that he will try to
do better are highly productive of leniency, just as they have been in the
family and in the community before.
On the contrary, the bellicose insurgence of one who feels that society has
wronged and despoiled him is apt to
bring a sentence of imprisonment.
Closely related to this situation is that
of the probation officer, engaged in
supervision. Here is an area of administrative discretion, in which the
supervisory officer-depending upon his
own emotional stability or lack of it-

may exercise leniency or repression
in the methods which he uses, largely
without interference or control from
a busy judge.
But the use of leniency in crime
treatment runs much farther bacl in
the chronology of particular cases, than
the point at which conviction occurs.
Quantitatively speaking there is a
much larger percentage of crime treatment prior to conviction than after
conviction; for the simple reason that
a large percentage of those who commit
crime are never convicted and a large
percentage are never even prosecuted.
Thus, no informed person would seriously challenge the following statement of Judge Claude C. Coffin ot
Colorado:
'It is said that the jury is the last
vestige of pure democracy. It may be
a guard against tyranny and despotic
government. Certainly it does, in criminal cases, leave the way open for a man's
peers to refuse to enforce a law that to
them seems harsh, if they be so minded;
and these same peers can, and too often
do approximateand exercise the pardoning power; . . ." [Italics supplied.]
Neither would an informed person
seriously question the fact that this
same type of pardoning power is freely
used by police and prosecuting officers.
One of the major functions of a prosecuting officer is to determine-sometimes
with the advice of a grand jury, frequently on his own initiative-whether
in a particular case, he shall prosecute,
effect a compromise, or refuse to prosecute altogether. One of the major discretionary activities of police officers is
to determine whether to reprimand offenders or to report their delinquencies
for further action. Frequently, the con-
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clusion which the officer reaches depends upon whether the offender
meekly acquiesces in his official insolence or whether he resents it and
protests in like terms.
Again, the use of leniency as a
method of crime treatment runs far
back of official action. The victim of an
occasional crime may make settlement
with the criminal and refuse to complain to the officers of the law. The
crime of misprison of felony is thus
frequently committed by otherwise
reputable citizens, because of a
mistaken assumption that it is proper
for them to promise offenders immunity
from prosecution, in consideration for
the return of stolen property or for
others forms of reimbursement. Similar
procedures may be followed in the case
of an embezzling clerk. And many a
parent, teacher and minister has used
the knowledge of crime commission as
a means of persuading or coercing improved conduct, rather than reporting
such offenses to public officers, according to the strict letter of the law.
It is equally interesting, in outlining
the body of generally accepted knowledge concerning this subject, to consider the reasons which cause the use
of leniency in particular cases by particular persons. Generally speaking, we
may say that mankind is motivated by
two conflicting emotions in its attitude
toward criminal conduct. The first of
these is a desire for revenge; the second is sympathy for the underdog.
Thus, when a person is injured as a result of crime, he desires revenge, or
what he may call compensation, or
retribution, or satisfaction. If the of-

fense is sufficiently grievous, the prevailing sentiment of the community, or
of the State, or even of the Nation, may
be one which calls for revenge. On the
other hand, the sympathy of the community may be with the offender. This
is particularly true where the community identifies itself with the offender
and regards him as one who has acted
in its behalf. Thus, George Washington,
from the official British point of view,
was guilty of treason, the most serious
offense in the whole category of crime.
But, presumably, a large majority of
the colonists and, indeed, many of the
English people, regarded him as a
noble patriot and an inspired leader of
men. In lesser cases and in descending
degree, the emotional attitude of the
community may favor an accused person and as a result may shape the action
of police, prosecutor, jury or judge in
the use of leniency.
In particular cases a wide variety
of reasons may be operative. Parental
pride or parental love, religious beliefs
or educational principles, medical or
psychiatric predispositions
are examples of intangibles which may consciously or unconsciously shape action.
Sometimes inherited or environmental
resentment against official oppression
may be the determining factor. Perhaps the motive may be traced back to
an honest difference of opinion as to
the wisdom of the law, and an inner
protest against the social desirability
of stigmatizing certain conduct as
crime. It is absurd in this connection
to Rssume, as some have done, that
climinal conduct can be clearly distinguished from non-criminal conduct
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or to assume, as I shall point out later
to the contrary, that criminals are a
distinct, classifiable group of persons.
When I speak of the use of leniency
by police, prosecutors, juries, judges,
probation and parole administrators
and governors, I do not mean to say
that all such officers make an improper
use of leniency. Many fine officers well
understand the difference between leniency and crime treatment; many fine
officers are making highly commendable records in the exercise of the important discretionary powers with
which they are vested. Nevertheless,
the Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures, as well as our own
experience, teaches us that the situation is far from satisfactory in many
respects and in many places. In the
case of officials who do exercise leniency improperly, they may do so because of pressures, political in character, or of similar pressures from social,
church or fraternal organizations. On
the contrary they may act because of
honest, though mistaken, convictions
that considerations impelling to mercy
may promise success and rehabilitation,
without danger to society. In the case
of police officials it may be merely that
resentment against prosecuting attorneys and judges for freeing previously arrested offenders has produced
a determination to take the law into
their own hands; a determination which
is worked out by the anomalous combination of vituperation and leniency,
which gives freedom to the offender
and vicarious satisfaction to the officer.
In the case of prosecuting attorneys
it may be no more than a canny

selection of cases most susceptible of
successful prosecution, with an eye to
the official "batting average" of convictions and acquittals; or it may be
merely a matter of laziness in avoiding
difficult and time - consuming trials
against high-pressure defense lawyers.
The jury which acquits may do so
because of resentment against a browbeating prosecutor or against a police
department which it suspects of using
the third degree. The judge who discharges a defendant may have in mind
the delinquencies of his own youth
and the acting-governor may have a
Jehovah complex with only limited opportunity to work at it.
Results of Leniency
We come now to a consideration of
some of the results which flow from
the improper use which is made of leniency in crime treatment. Obviously,
great discrepancies may result between
cases in which, for one reason or another, leniency operates and cases in
which it does not. Where leniency is
substituted for parole preparation and
careful selection of parolees, the probable result is failure on parole; with
consequent disillusionment of the
public; justified protests from police,
prosecutors and judges; and loss of
prestige on the part of those qualified
parole officials who are trying to reestablish the concept of parole as a
valid part of the treatment process.
Where leniency is substituted for
thorough pre-sentence investigation
and careful selection of probationers,
the results are similarly destructive.
A boy who escapes punishment because
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of effective intervention based upon
parental love may be a much more
dangerous risk to society than the one
who has no parent, and lacking effective intervention goes to the penitentiary. One man may serve a long
sentence because he went to trial without a. lawyer, while another may go
free because a prosecutor elects not
to proceed, in a no more doubtful case,
against a defense lawyer with an impressive record of acquittals. The man
who can summon no support in his
time of crisis-financial, social, political,
fraternal, family or otherwise, is much
more likely than others to receive the
brand. The man who can summon no
such support in time of crisis is most
apt to be the poor, ignorant, inept man,
with long ears or flat feet or other
pseudo-scientific stigmata of inadequacy
and degeneracy. The man who commits a popular crime which brings to
him the sympathy of the community
is most apt to be the popular and persuasive type of person; the man who
commits the unpopular type of crime
is most apt to be the unpopular, unpersuasive type of person. For, indeed, a
popular leader of the type of Huey Long
may persuade a majority of the voters
to place him in such a position of power
that no misconduct can find him out;
while his luckless followers-after his
departure-may tread the dismal path
to dishonor and imprisonment.
I realize, full well, that some of the
things which I am saying are unconventional and that, taken as a whole,
they may seem to present a rather appalling picture. Certainly the picture
as thus seen departs a long way from

the conventional assumptions that this
is "a government of law and not of
men;" that all men are equal before
the law; that crime is a fixed concept;
that criminals are persons to be classified on a basis of stigmata and thus
rationalized out of the disturbing reality
of individual conscience and community
consciousness.
But if the truth lies outside conventional lines, then, particularly in these
trying times, it is much better that the
truth be spoken by one who is a friend of
our present order and who desires its
preservation, than by one who uses the
truth to attack, and hopes thus to destroy the institutions of our civilization.
I reject, definitely, the idea that in a
democracy such truths should be concealed or avoided. He is no friend of
our way of life and our philosophy of
government, who leaves half-covered,
to be dug up by incendiaries, unpleasant facts such as those which I
have just summarized. If we are willing to recognize-unpalatable as it may
be-the body of information which I
have just outlined; if we are willing
to face, honestly and frankly, the implications which result therefrom; we
may be able to step forward with reasonable assurance, in developing and
using effective procedures for improvement. And this brings me to the concluding, and constructive portion of
this discussion.
How Criminal Laws Originate
Recognition of the fact that these
great impelling human attitudes are
now existing and have always existed
should warn us that careful reexamina-
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tions of our criminal law is in order;
to determine how much of it which was
emotionally produced in earlier days
is sound and useful under present conditions. I have earlier repudiated the
pseudo-scientific concept that criminal
conduct can be clearly distinguished
from non-criminal conduct or that
criminals are a distinct, classifiable
group of persons. Apart from the mysteries, the imputations of sacredness or
of divine origin-the totem pole phases
of criminal law-which were devised
to give a more powerful sanction to its
administration, substantive criminal
law is no more than a collection of
rules of human conduct which have
been devised from time to time by law
makers, in response to the real will
of the community in some cases, and
in response to voluble minorities in
many others. How far it departs from
divine origin may be suggested by the
fact that several of the ten commandments are not embodied in the criminal
law and that in its truest form crime
is an offense against a temporal government, with which, I suspect, divinity
has little concern.
Surely it is not too much to ask the
pseudo-scientists to look about them;
to see criminal law in the making; to
realize that, as Sanford Bates remarked
some years ago, approximately seventyfive percent of the inmates of Federal
penitentiaries were there for the commission of crimes which were not
crimes fifteen years before. The typical situation in criminal law making
today is that an aggressive minority,
seeking to change a social or economic
situation, secures the passage of a law,

which contains a penal provision deliberately designed to put teeth into
its enforcement. Is it necessary to look
for stigmata to find the reason for
criminality in a situation such as was
described by a speaker in the City of
San Francisco, a few years ago? On
one day, he said, it constituted criminal conduct to carry a flask of whiskey
in his pocket, but very commendable
to carry a gold coin. One year later it
was a crime to possess the gold coin
and at least non-criminal to carry the
whiskey.
Two groups in a community, of almost equal number, struggle through
a bitter campaign to determine
whether certain conduct shall be proscribed and punished as crime. One side
prevails; the other side loses. Some of
the losers are good sports and agree to
abide by the verdict. Some are poor
sports but nevertheless agree to abide
by the verdict. Some refuse to abide
and violate the new law. Of these, some
are caught; and of the latter some who
have long ears, or flat feet, or hollow
chests are punished. Are they criminals because they have stigmata, or
because a sincere, earnest group of citizens in the community has persuaded
the majority that it is time, in the development of their civilization, to lift
the bars a little higher against certain
conduct? It is here that leniency comes
into operation, as a compromise against
the rigors of unexpected and perhaps
undesired results.
Recognition of the philosophy of leniency should prompt us, also, to be
humble in the face of new developments
and new proposals and less tenacious of
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the areas which we as professional and
social workers have pre-empted. One
of the beneficial results of the philosophy of leniency in crime treatment, is
the restless dissatisfaction which it produces with present methods. That there
is substantial justification for this point
of view is apparent from the fact that
in spite of the continually increasing
effectiveness of" methods of detection,
apprehension, and prosecution, crime
still continues to increase both in volume and in seriousness. Out of this
restless dissatisfaction has come the
drives for the juvenile court, for probation, for psychiatric clinics, for parole, for scientific penal treatment; for
improved professional personnel; for
better equipment and for more reliable
information concerning causes and results. A striking recent example is the
youth -justice -authority

act

recently

adopted in California.
Closely related to this type of social
development is the willingness of highly
qualified persons to give generously of
their time and energy in order to secure such new legislation and to make
possible such new experiments, for
balancing the pressures of life against
the proscriptions of the law. Great
names are associated with each great
new development such as that of the
juvenile court, of probation and of pa-

role; just as great names are associated
with new developments in other fields
of political and social life. But as the
new development finds its place in the
social or governmental structure, lesser
men come along, who pre-empt the new
device, who settle into a small routine
of security and, like the squid, attempt
to besmirch and scuttle each new development, with exactly the same arguments and methods as the small-minded
people who years before attempted to
scuttle the devices of which they are
today so proud.
Surely it is not necessary for me to
go farther. The cause which I am
pleading is that of understanding, of
tolerance, of.co-operation, in the ever
developing soundness and effectiveness
of our civilization. I do not disparage
the philosophy of leniency; I merely
recognize its existence, its potency, and
its symbolic character, in guiding us
upon our way. It provides a starting
point from which may come realization
of our need for more intensive research
into the springs of human conduct;
more intelligent provision of standards
to control such conduct; better personnel in the administration of such standards; and realization also of the vital
need for co-operation'in our various
efforts toward these ends.

"In men whom men condemn as ill, I find so much goodness still; in men
Af sin and blot, I hesitate to draw
whom men pronounce divine, I find so
-Joachin Miller.
the line between the two, where God has
"We prosecute the man or woman who steals the Goose from off the Common, and let the greater felon loose, who steals the Common from the Goose."
-G. K. Chesterton.

